Is amlchecks.vercel.app a scam? TrustSniffer's high-risk assessment: 0/100

Security Alert

Fortinet, Sophos flagged this site in external intelligence checks, indicating elevated compromise/scam exposure that requires immediate caution.

This website presents itself as "AML Checks", a web-based risk scanner for TRON addresses and USDT TRC20 transfers. It is published on a free subdomain of a shared application-hosting platform rather than on an independently registered domain. A visitor is shown a single-page tool that promises anti-money-laundering risk screening of blockchain addresses, which implies that visitors will submit wallet addresses and may interact with crypto-asset workflows. Its apparent purpose is to offer compliance-style address screening to crypto users, but no independent evidence connects it to a recognised compliance provider or a real-world operator.

Scam/Impersonation Risk

Contradictory signals are present and are decisive. The site is blacklisted by external threat-intelligence sources. A substantial number of independent detection engines classify it as malicious, and two tier-one security vendors are among them. Historical phishing intelligence is also associated with the hostname. This is the strongest finding in the assessment, and the site's valid encryption and mainstream hosting cannot offset it. A separate set of abuse reports exists, but it is attributed to a shared address of the hosting platform's delivery network, which serves many unrelated tenants, so it is discounted and not counted against this site. No confirmed brand impersonation, conflicting legal identities, or on-page phishing form was observed. The blacklist is nonetheless sufficient for a cautionary posture. Behavioural testing showed almost all network traffic going to external destinations, including POST requests to third-party endpoints outside the platform's expected services. For a tool that invites users to submit wallet addresses, that outbound data flow is a concrete exposure. The same testing found no wallet-connection prompts, no wallet-drainer behaviour, no clipboard manipulation, no hidden or password-bearing external forms, and no cloaking. Together these indicate the risk lies in reputation and data egress, not in an observed drainer mechanism. A service that sells address-risk assurance to crypto users while carrying malicious detections is an inherently inconsistent combination. Evidence:

• Homepage and hostname: 15 detection engines classify the site as malicious and 3 as suspicious, including two tier-one vendors, and the external blacklist is active.
• Homepage sandbox runs (3 of 3 completed): 17 external XHR/fetch calls and 18 external POSTs, 3 of them to non-whitelisted destinations, with external traffic at roughly 99% in the peak run.
• Homepage sandbox runs: no wallet-provider activity, clipboard writes, hidden forms, or cloaking detected.
• Shared delivery-network address: 82 abuse reports on a shared provider address, assessed as shared-infrastructure noise and discounted.

Regulatory Verification Notes

The only page analysed is the homepage, which presents an AML screening service for TRON and USDT TRC20 addresses. The evidence establishes no operator identity, legal entity, licence, or registration number that would make such a compliance-related claim credible. The operator is not identifiable through an independent domain registration, because the site sits on a subdomain of a shared hosting platform, and ownership is therefore opaque. This is a verification and transparency matter, not proof of misconduct by itself, but alongside the threat listings it leaves no mitigating institutional context. The third-party broker-reputation dataset returned no match; this is neutral and is not a regulatory verdict in either direction. Any claim that the tool is authorised, audited, or affiliated with a compliance body should be treated as unsupported. Evidence:

• Homepage: the page title advertises a "TRON Address & USDT TRC20 AML Risk Scanner" on the platform's shared hostname, and the supplied evidence contains no named operator or authorisation.
• Hosting: served from AS16509 (Amazon-02, US, ARIN registry).
• Transport encryption: TLS certificate issued by WR1 (DV, domain-validated only), valid to 2026-11-27; this confirms encryption but not identity.
• Broker-reputation lookup: no match, with no licensing information available from that source.

What to Verify Next

Before any engagement, the site's claimed purpose should be tested against independent sources. The first step is to confirm through an independent route whether any recognised compliance or blockchain-analytics provider publishes or endorses this tool. A second step is to establish who operates it, through an official channel reached independently of the site, and to check any regulatory standing claimed. A third step is to confirm the official support and contact channels through an offline route. Because the tool invites address submission, the third-party endpoints receiving its outbound POST traffic should also be reviewed in a controlled environment before any real address or data is entered. Evidence:

• Homepage: the AML-scanner positioning is the only identity claim and is uncorroborated by the supplied evidence.
• Sandbox network log: 3 non-whitelisted external POST destinations require attribution.
• Threat-intelligence results: the current malicious detections should be rechecked for delisting before the site is reconsidered.

Summary Verdict

The overall posture is high-risk. Confirmed external blacklisting and malicious detections override the benign technical hygiene observed, and the operator's real-world identity is unestablished. The site is not suitable for any sensitive or financial interaction on the current evidence.

Infrastructure Integrity

The site is delivered through a CDN/WAF layer on Amazon-operated address space, with all observed addresses being edge servers and the origin server not observable. This is a mitigating factor only, because it shows mainstream hosting but not who operates the content, and edge-only visibility prevents independent verification of what sits behind it. It also allows content to be changed quickly without notice. Infrastructure quality therefore cannot offset the reputation findings.

Closing Assessment

Interaction should be limited to passive viewing at most. No wallet addresses, credentials, wallet connections, or payments should be submitted until the blacklisting is resolved and an independent source establishes the operator's legitimacy.

Signals weighed against the site

• AbuseIPDB: 82 reports on hosting IP 64.29.17.131 (Vercel, Inc, Content Delivery Network), 0% confidence. The reports are attributed to shared infrastructure, not specifically to this website.