If a Telegram post sent you to a DOTO sale, check the address first. Babak Zanjani's own site names dotomarket.com as the only official Dotomarket address and says dotomarket.org has no connection with Dot One. The sale promoted on Telegram runs on dotomarket.org and dotomarket.net, and its treasury received 50,683 USDT by 11 November 2026. DOTO is a new token sold in Persian for USDT, presented as the coin of Dot One, Zanjani's holding company. Our checks, made on 11 and 12 November 2026, are listed in "How we checked".

The official DOTO address, and the look-alikes

On 11 November 2026 (20 Aban 1405) Babak Zanjani's official website posted "Where to start buying DOTO?". It says a buyer needs an invite code, then registers on the official website, and gives one address: "The only official address of Dotomarket: dotomarket.com". Under "Warning about fake and fraudulent sites" it lists sites that "have no connection with Dot One and Dotomarket" and tells readers not to register, connect a wallet or deposit there (the post, read 12 November 2026). What each address is:

  • dotomarket.com: the official address, according to Zanjani's site. Registered on 20 October 2026, served through ArvanCloud. Its transparency page publishes only the USDT contract it accepts (BEP-20) and says its treasury wallet addresses "have not been published yet", with DOTO's own treasury on "the DotOne network". It links no Telegram channel. TrustSniffer's analysis of the official site: LOW TRUST, 25/100, mainly because it asks for USDT while naming no legal entity, regulator or address; no antivirus engine flagged it.
  • dotomarket.org: named as fake by Zanjani's site. TrustSniffer: CRITICAL, 0/100.
  • dotomarket.net: its twin. Not on Zanjani's list, but the same Telegram channel calls it the "backup domain" of dotomarket.org, it sits on the same server address with the same anonymous name servers, and it serves the same build. TrustSniffer: CRITICAL, 0/100.
  • dotomarkets.com: another look-alike, with an added "s". Registered on 5 November 2026, the same day as dotomarket.net, on a different registrar and network; it also sells "DOTO" for USDT by invitation. TrustSniffer: CRITICAL, 2/100.
  • Telegram. Zanjani's site lists t.me/babakzanjani2 as his account and names t.me/babakzanjanii1 as a fake. The channel quoted in this article, @dotomarket_chanel (about 73,000 subscribers), is linked from dotomarket.org, not from dotomarket.com.

Three more domains on the same setup

Registration records show three more domains set up exactly like dotomarket.org and dotomarket.net. They were registered within 17 seconds of each other on the afternoon of 11 November 2026 (UTC), through the same registrar (Tucows), with the same three privacy-focused Njalla name servers, and they point to the same Vercel server address, 216.150.1.1:

  • dotomarket.click: registered 14:09:51 UTC (from the .click registry), certificate issued 14:27 UTC.
  • dotomarket.link: registered 14:09:55 UTC, certificate issued 14:19 UTC.
  • dotomarket.top: registered 14:10:08 UTC, certificate issued 14:27 UTC.

On 12 November all three served an empty page marked "noindex", which tells search engines to leave it out. That is what domains held in reserve look like: nothing is sold there yet, but each can be switched to the sale in minutes, as dotomarket.net was when the channel announced it as a "backup domain". The same registrar, name servers and server address do not by themselves prove one owner; the matching names, the same day and the same setup down to the second are why we list them together. If you see any of them in a DOTO post, treat it like dotomarket.org.

Zanjani's list also names dotone.observer, dotone.click, dotone1.com, dotone.nexus and dotone.trading as fakes. TrustSniffer has not analysed those yet. Everything below about prices, contracts and money is about the look-alike sale on dotomarket.org and dotomarket.net.

The look-alike sale: two sites, both 0/100

The video sends buyers to dotomarket.org. The channel's posts of 8 to 11 November link dotomarket.net, which the channel called a "backup domain" on 10 November after the main site went down "because of the rush of users"; the site's own security page names both as official. Zanjani's site says the opposite (see above). Both domains are days old, registered through the same registrar (Tucows) with the same privacy-focused name servers (Njalla): dotomarket.org on 29 October 2026 and dotomarket.net on 5 November 2026. Both are hosted on Vercel and serve the same pages.

  • dotomarket.org: CRITICAL, 0/100, assessed 11 November 2026, evidence complete. Domain 13 days old at capture.
  • dotomarket.net: CRITICAL, 0/100, assessed 11 November 2026, evidence partial (the web-archive lookup returned nothing for a domain this new). Domain 6 days old at capture.
  • dotomarkets.com: CRITICAL, 2/100, assessed 11 November 2026. Domain 6 days old at capture. A separate look-alike: different registrar and network, its own invite-only "pre-listing" page.
  • What drives both scores: an offer that routes buyers' money to an operator-held wallet, strong red flags in the page content, no legal entity, team, address or licence on any of the site's 14 pages, Telegram as the only contact, a domain owner hidden behind privacy protection, and a days-old domain.
  • What does not drive them: no antivirus engine called either site malicious (VirusTotal returned 0 malicious and 1 to 2 "suspicious" votes), Google Safe Browsing does not list them, and our sandbox saw no data sent to outside hosts. This is not a phishing kit that steals passwords. The risk is the offer itself.

A TrustSniffer score summarises evidence at one point in time; it is not a legal finding. A 0 means the risk signals we measure stacked up past the bottom of the scale. Each report lists every finding that counted, and the ones we recorded but did not count.

Token presale
A sale of a new token before it trades on any exchange. Buyers pay first and can sell only after a listing, if one happens. Until then the seller alone sets the price, and no one else is obliged to buy.

Two voices: what the channel promises, what the site disclaims

dotomarket.org links one Telegram channel, @dotomarket_chanel, as official in its footer, and its terms say only contracts announced "on this site and the official DOTO channel" are real. On 11 November that channel had about 72,000 subscribers, and its 9 November countdown post showed over 340,000 views (read from the channel's public web preview that day). It makes promises the site refuses to make, and it invokes Dot One and Zanjani, whose own site disowns dotomarket.org. The official dotomarket.com links no Telegram channel (checked 12 November 2026).

Captured Telegram post promising 500 percent guaranteed profit next to the captured risk page saying no profit is guaranteed, with English translations
Real captures of the channel's 9 November post and the site's risk disclosure, taken by TrustSniffer on 11 November 2026, with our translations.

The guarantee ("end of Bahman" is 19 February 2027) was posted again on 10 and 11 November. A market maker is a firm that keeps buying and selling a token to keep its price steady; claiming one with a $2 billion budget is a claim that someone will buy whatever early buyers sell. The site's terms (version 6) say the opposite: "We do not promise profit, market price or a definite listing time", and even the promotional video ends on "these are contract prices, not a promise of profit or market price".

Table comparing five claims by the DOTO Telegram channel with what dotomarket.org itself says
Five points where the look-alikes' channel and their own site disagree. Quotes translated from Persian by TrustSniffer; lines marked "TrustSniffer" are our analysis, not the site's words.
Three captured posts from the DOTO Telegram channel with English translations: the countdown, the raised purchase cap and the backup domain
Three more posts from @dotomarket_chanel, the look-alikes' channel,, captured from its public web view on 11 November 2026. Telegram links and the admin account are hidden: TrustSniffer does not publish contacts.

What the channel's full history shows

An export of @dotomarket_chanel's full history, 47 posts from 23 October to 11 November 2026, was supplied to TrustSniffer on 11 November; its recent posts match the public channel word for word. It shows how DOTO was presented before its site existed, and how its terms moved. Times below are converted to UTC.

  • DOTO was introduced as Dot One's own coin. The first post (23 October) reads: "In Dot One's dedicated blockchain, DOTO is the main coin of the network", over a screenshot of an explorer called "DotOneScan" that carries the same logo as the DOTO site. The token the look-alike sites sell is a BEP-20 token on BNB Smart Chain; the official dotomarket.com publishes no BNB Smart Chain token contract and places DOTO's treasury on "the DotOne network". TrustSniffer could not open dotonescan.io (registered 1 February 2026) to check that explorer, and the logo on Dot One's own site, dotone.ir, is a different mark.
  • The channel borrows Babak Zanjani's and Dot One's names. Its posts of 29 October, 3 November and 6 November end with the hashtags #BabakZanjani and #DotOne. Zanjani's own site says the sites it promotes have no connection with Dot One.
  • The sale was announced before its domain existed. At 10:23 UTC on 29 October the channel said the private sale "officially starts" that night; dotomarket.org was registered at 11:25 UTC, an hour later, and the sale contract was deployed on 1 November.
  • The channel published allocations the site has not. The 29 October image gives Founder 15% (15 billion DOTO), Validators and system development 15%, Marketing 5% and Treasury 5%. At the $0.10 the channel calls guaranteed, the founder's share alone would be worth $1.5 billion.
  • It described a treasury that the chain does not show. On 4 November the channel wrote that "Dot One's treasury is protected by a 3-of-5 multisig; no one alone can move its assets". The wallet DOTO's sale contract pays has no contract code on-chain (read 11 November), so it is an ordinary single-key wallet, as the site itself says.
The channel first post showing a DotOneScan explorer screenshot, and the 29 October allocation table with a 15 percent founder share
Two images from the channel's history, from the export supplied to TrustSniffer on 11 November 2026, with translations of the posts they came with.
Table of DOTO sale rules that changed between channel posts: purchase cap, invites, validator minimum, launch venue, treasury
The sale's rules as the channel stated them, and what it, the site or the chain said later. Sources: the channel export, dotomarket.org and TrustSniffer's on-chain read.

The price ladder, and who the "guarantee" serves

The tokenomics page sets a total supply of 100 billion DOTO, allocates 60% to "public and private sale", and says the other allocations will be published "after they are finalised". The invite-only step 0 sells at 0.017 USDT until 29 Aban (20 November 2026). Ten weekly public steps follow, from 0.0200 to 0.0700 USDT, ending on 9 Bahman (29 January 2027), with 30 billion DOTO on sale across them. The contract stores exactly these prices, volumes and dates, and step 0 has a volume of 1 billion DOTO. If every public step sold out, that is about $1.14 billion at the published prices.

Bar chart of the eleven DOTO sale steps from 0.017 to 0.070 USDT against a dashed line at 0.10 USDT
The eleven price steps from the site's tokenomics page (identical in the contract), against the $0.10 launch price the channel calls guaranteed. Red: each step's gain at $0.10.
  • The "500%" is a step 0 number. From 0.017 to 0.10 is +488%. A buyer in step 5 (0.035) would make +186% at the same price, and a buyer in the last public step (0.0700) +43%. Every later buyer pays more for the same "guarantee".
  • The "$10 billion market cap" is arithmetic, not demand. Market capitalisation is price times supply. 100 billion DOTO × $0.10 = $10 billion: the promised price multiplied by the supply the project created itself. At the step 0 price the same sum gives $1.7 billion, for a token nobody can yet trade.
  • Unlocking is lopsided. At listing, everything bought in steps 1 to 10 unlocks at once, and step 0 unlocks in four parts (25% at listing, then 25% every 30 days). The risk page warns that "selling pressure may be high and the price may fall". The channel's answer to that risk is the Dot One market-maker claim, which appears nowhere on the site.
  • The rules can still move. The published contract lets its owner replace steps that have not started, extend the current step with 24 hours' notice, change the referral share (up to 10%), change the per-buyer cap and change the wallet that receives future payments. The channel's own figures for that cap contradict each other: 10,000 USDT on 4 November, then "changed from $1,000 to $20,000" on 10 November.

How the sale spreads: referral rewards and a toman prize

Step 0 is invite only: a buyer needs a code from the channel's admin or a link from someone who has already bought. Every buyer then gets a referral link. The contract pays the referrer 5% of each invited friend's purchases (one level, into the referrer's balance), and the channel adds a $1 reward per successful invite; the video's example is a friend's first 100 USDT buy crediting the inviter 6 USDT (5% plus $1). During step 0 each buyer can invite up to 100 people.

A "top referrers" contest, running from 13 Aban to the end of step 10, offers ten prizes, the first up to 3 billion toman. Prizes are paid in toman to a bank card in the winner's name, but each is capped at 10% of what that person's invitees bought: the full first prize needs invitees who bought 30 billion toman of DOTO. The roadmap also promises an unveiling ceremony in Tehran. One-level referral rewards do not make DOTO a pyramid scheme. They do turn early buyers into the sale's marketing team, paid into a balance that cannot yet be withdrawn through the site, and they reward recruiting before anyone can know whether the token will ever trade.

Where a buyer's money goes

Buying is not a swap on an exchange. The FAQ describes three steps: sign up with an email code (8 digits, valid 10 minutes) or by connecting Trust Wallet or MetaMask; send USDT on BNB Smart Chain (the BEP-20 standard) to a "personal deposit address", credited after 5 network confirmations; then press buy. The site pays the network fees. It sells no DOTO for rials: buyers are told to buy USDT with rials at an exchange first.

dotomarket.org and dotomarket.net publish their contract addresses on a "transparency" page. These contracts appear only on the look-alike sites: the official dotomarket.com publishes only the USDT contract and says its treasury addresses "have not been published yet" (read 12 November 2026). The sale contract, 0xBe03…0d28, has its source code published and verified (Sourcify record) under the name DOTOPrivateSale. Reading it shows a real safeguard: each deposit address is a small contract that can only pay the treasury, as a purchase, or the buyer back. It also shows where the money ends up: on 11 November the contract's owner and its treasury were the same address, 0xe3df…988a.

Flow diagram: buyer to personal deposit address to treasury wallet, triggered by the sale contract; DOTO locked in the contract until listing or March 2028
The path of a buyer's USDT, from the site's own pages, the contract's verified source and TrustSniffer's on-chain reads of 11 November 2026.
  • An ordinary wallet holds the money. The site says sale proceeds "for now go to an ordinary wallet" and lists moving them to a multi-signature wallet, "which no single key can spend", as "on the way". A multi-signature wallet needs several keys to approve a payment; an ordinary wallet needs one. That same wallet owns the sale contract.
  • No independent audit. An audit is a review of contract code by an outside security firm. The site's own status table: "not done yet".
  • Email buyers depend on the operator. For an account opened by email (the route that needs no wallet), the contract lets the site name the wallet that will receive that buyer's refunds and DOTO, and lets the owner change it at any time, effective 48 hours later.
  • Your DOTO is locked until a listing whose date "is not yet known". The contract's deadline is 20 March 2028, 00:00 Tehran (19 March 20:30 UTC): if no listing is set by then, withdrawal opens anyway, which the risk page says "does not mean a market or a buyer for DOTO exists at that time". The contract does stop the owner from taking DOTO that buyers already bought.
  • Deposits cannot be withdrawn through the site yet. The FAQ: withdrawal from the panel "has not opened yet and will open soon", so "only deposit the amount you want to buy with".

What the contract itself says about the sale

The contract keeps public counters that anyone can read on a block explorer. Read at 21:35 UTC on 11 November, they show the sale's real size: 659 buyers and 3.03 million DOTO sold, all in step 0, worth 51,520 USDT at 0.017; a few hundred buyers and tens of thousands of dollars, against a channel that speaks of billions. Step 0 holds 1 billion DOTO, so it was 99.7% unsold while the countdown ran.

Cards showing 659 buyers, 3.03 million DOTO sold, a computed 51,520 USDT sold value and 2,116 USDT left in the treasury, with a bar showing 0.30 percent of step 0 sold
Live values from the DOTOPrivateSale contract (buyerCount, totalSold, stepSold) and the USDT token on BNB Smart Chain, read by TrustSniffer at 21:35 UTC on 11 November 2026. They change by the hour.

Two dates do not line up. According to the contract's verification record, the token and the sale contract were deployed on 1 November 2026 at 21:42 UTC (block 131,122,902), and the contract's step 0 starts at that second. The site says the invite sale ran from 1 Aban (23 October), and dotomarket.org was registered on 29 October. An earlier domain or contract could explain the gap; TrustSniffer found none, and the site names none.

Every dollar in and out of the treasury

We read the treasury wallet's complete USDT history on BNB Smart Chain, from the first sale to 21:32 UTC on 11 November, counting genuine USDT only. It received 50,683 USDT in 835 payments from 671 buyers' deposit addresses; that is the 51,520 USDT sold, less the referral share the contract pays to referrers instead. It sent out 48,566 USDT in 133 transfers, which leaves the 2,116 USDT it held at that moment: the two sides reconcile to the cent.

Cumulative chart of USDT into and out of the DOTO treasury from 1 to 11 November 2026, with the large withdrawals marked
Every USDT payment into and out of the treasury since the sale opened, from the wallet's full transfer history on BNB Smart Chain, read by TrustSniffer on 11 November 2026.

Almost all of the money left in eight transfers to two wallets. Between 6 and 11 November, 17,134 USDT went in seven transfers to 0x653a…81cc, a wallet in use since 12 August that has moved about 103,600 USDT in and 102,500 out with many counterparties. Then, at 20:04 UTC on 11 November, 30,433.41 USDT went in a single transfer to 0x808d…655b, a wallet that had never been used. The rest, 999 USDT, was small payments: 107 of 1 USDT, the size of the advertised per-invite reward, and 13 of 50 USDT, all of them to buyers' deposit addresses, plus one of 41 and one of 201 to a third wallet. The sale contract still named the same treasury for new payments.

An owner may move its own funds, and these transfers alone do not show where the money will go next. They do show one key moving 98% of everything paid out: the opposite of the channel's 4 November promise that a "3-of-5 multisig" protects the treasury and "no one alone can move its assets".

Hop-by-hop trace: buyers to the DOTO treasury, then 30,433 USDT to a new wallet and 17,134 USDT to an active wallet, with risk findings
Following the money from the wallets' full USDT history on BNB Smart Chain. TrustSniffer's wallet-risk engine traces Ethereum and TRON, so this trace was built from the chain's own records.

We followed the money one more hop. The new wallet had received exactly one transfer, the 30,433.41 USDT from the treasury (transaction 0x390106cd…669c), had sent nothing, and held no BNB, so it could not yet pay the network fee to move the USDT. The active wallet keeps paying many addresses, which we did not follow further; its history also carries fake lookalike "USDT" tokens sent to it as spam, which we left out. None of the three receiving wallets appears in TrustSniffer's sanctions data or in its lists of exchanges, bridges and known services, and the OFAC entries for Zanjani and Dot One list no addresses (they are named here only because the look-alikes' channel borrows them). So there is no sanctions exposure to report on these wallets today, and who controls them is not identified; what the trace shows is the concentration: one key, two wallets, almost everything.

Whose names the look-alikes borrow: Babak Zanjani and Dot One

The look-alike sites never mention Dot One or Babak Zanjani. Their channel does, crediting "Dot One's market makers" and "Mr. Zanjani's bitcoins". Zanjani's own site says dotomarket.org has no connection with Dot One or Dotomarket, so on the evidence available these are borrowed names, used to make the sale look backed. TrustSniffer has not established who operates the look-alike sites or their channel. The names matter for a second reason: both are on the US sanctions list, which affects anyone dealing with the official sale as well. In the US Treasury's own records:

  • Babak Morteza Zanjani is on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, program IRAN-EO13902, marked "Subject to Secondary Sanctions" (OFAC SDN entry). Treasury designated him on 30 January 2026, saying he was "freed from imprisonment in order to launder money for the regime", together with two UK-registered crypto exchanges linked to him, Zedcex and Zedxion; it said Zedcex had processed "over $94 billion in transactions" since August 2022 and that addresses of both exchanges processed funds for wallets linked to Iran's IRGC (Treasury, 30 January 2026).
  • Dot One Value Creation Group is on the same list, program IRAN-EO13902, "Subject to Secondary Sanctions", "Linked To: ZANJANI, Babak Morteza". Its listed aliases include "DOTONE" and "DOT ONE HOLDING", with dotone.ir and one-holding.ir as its websites (OFAC SDN entry). Treasury designated it on 24 July 2026 as Zanjani's primary holding company, with DotOne Gold, DotOne Rail, DotOne Barter, DotOne Airlines and DotOne Trip, and described DotOne Gold as integral to Tala Token, an "allegedly gold-backed" token. The same release says Zanjani was sentenced to death in Iran in 2016 for embezzling from the National Iranian Oil Company and that the sentence was commuted in 2024 (Treasury, 24 July 2026).
  • Zanjani denies the allegations, calling them a "fake report" according to the Wall Street Journal, and has said on X that the companies and individuals sanctioned outside Iran have no commercial relationship with him (Benzinga, republished by Sahm Capital, 26 July 2026).
OFAC designation
A listing by the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Property of a designated person or entity under US jurisdiction is blocked, as is that of entities they own 50% or more, and US persons are generally barred from dealing with them. "Secondary sanctions" means non-US persons can be sanctioned too for significant dealings with them.
Timeline of DOTO dates from domain registration and contract deployment to the planned launch, beside the 2026 US Treasury designations
DOTO's dates, with the two Treasury actions the channel's claim brings into play shown in blue. Persian dates converted. Sources: Treasury releases sb0375 and sb0576, registration records, dotomarket.org, the DOTO channel, Sourcify.

What that could mean for people who deal with DOTO

First, what is true today: no DOTO address is on the SDN list. Neither the Zanjani entry nor the Dot One entry lists any digital currency address (checked 11 November 2026), and DOTO itself is not designated. For a buyer on the look-alike sites the first risk is simpler: paying a seller that Zanjani's own site disowns. The sanctions risks below concern the official DOTO sale, which Zanjani's site presents as Dot One's, and would follow if OFAC designates DOTO or its addresses, as it has done for other crypto businesses it tied to the same network.

  1. Designated addresses can be frozen. When OFAC designated Zedcex and Zedxion it listed their TRON addresses (Elliptic), and since December 2023 Tether has frozen the USDT it issues at addresses on OFAC's list (Cointelegraph). After OFAC listed 134 addresses linked to ISIS-K on 1 July 2026, Tether froze the balances of all 131 that were on TRON, as reported the next day (Cointelegraph). TrustSniffer's own sanctions data records all seven listed Zedcex addresses as sanctioned. Whether the USDT contract on BNB Smart Chain, where DOTO is paid, would freeze a listed address depends on that contract; TrustSniffer did not establish it.
  2. Wallets that touch them get flagged. Blockchain-analytics providers, TrustSniffer among them, mark addresses linked to designated parties, and exchanges screen deposits against those marks. A wallet that sent money to, or received money from, a designated address can show "sanctions exposure", and an exchange may hold the deposit or restrict the account. In Elliptic's words after the Zedcex listing, its customers can now "ensure that they do not inadvertently process funds" tied to those addresses. TrustSniffer's wallet check reports this kind of exposure for Ethereum and TRON; it does not trace BNB Smart Chain.
  3. Secondary sanctions reach non-US people and businesses. Both SDN entries carry "Subject to Secondary Sanctions". For the same executive order, OFAC says that "foreign financial institutions and other non-U.S. persons who transact with" designated exchanges "may also face sanctions" (OFAC FAQ 1257).
  4. The rial on-ramp is already sanctioned. The site tells buyers to buy USDT with rials at an exchange. The same OFAC FAQ names Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, Ramzinex and Aban Tether as exchanges designated under that order; Treasury designated the first four on 2 June 2026 (IranWatch) and Aban Tether on 7 August 2026 (Treasury release, republished by the IRS). USDT withdrawn from a designated exchange already carries that exposure in screening tools, whatever it is used for next.
  5. Listings get harder. A centralised exchange that follows US sanctions screens what it lists. The roadmap's "spring 1406" CEX listing would meet that question if the channel's claim were true.

For buyers on the look-alike sites, the borrowed name is the whole promise: the "market makers with a $2 billion budget" that are meant to answer the site's own warning about a crash at launch are a claim made by a channel the named owner disowns. The look-alike sites' terms leave the legal question to the buyer: checking whether buying and holding DOTO is allowed "is up to you". For more on how freezes and exposure work in practice, see our USDT freeze tracker, whether a deposit can come from a sanctioned address and OFAC's freeze of $344M linked to Iran's central bank.

How we checked, and how you can check it yourself

  1. The official address. Babak Zanjani's post "Where to start buying DOTO?" on babakzanjani.ir (20 Aban 1405, 11 November 2026) and the transparency page of dotomarket.com, both read on 12 November 2026.
  2. The sites. TrustSniffer's analysis captured each domain in a browser sandbox, read its pages with an AI reader, and checked registration, hosting, certificates, VirusTotal, Google Safe Browsing and AbuseIPDB. The reports are public and list every finding: dotomarket.org, dotomarket.net, dotomarkets.com, and the official dotomarket.com.
  3. The quotes. Every site quote comes from the live pages on 11 November (risk disclosure v4, terms v6, FAQ, tokenomics, transparency, roadmap, whitepaper, the referral-contest news post), translated from Persian by TrustSniffer. Persian dates were converted to the Gregorian calendar (29 Aban 1405 = 20 November 2026; 9 Bahman 1405 = 29 January 2027; 1 Farvardin 1407 = 20 March 2028).
  4. The channel. @dotomarket_chanel's last 20 public posts were read and captured from its web preview, and a full export of its 47 posts, supplied to TrustSniffer, was read and checked against them.
  5. The video. The 50-second promotional video was reviewed frame by frame. It sends buyers to dotomarket.org; the channel's posts link dotomarket.net.
  6. The contract. Open the sale contract on BscScan, choose "Contract", then "Read Contract", and read owner(), treasury(), buyerCount() and totalSold(). Compare every address with the site's transparency page, at least the first and last six characters. The deployment transaction and block are in the contract's verification record.
  7. The sanctions. Search OFAC's sanctions list for "Zanjani" and "Dot One"; the entries and the Treasury releases are linked above.

What we could not establish

  • Who runs the look-alike sites and their channel.
  • Whether the official DOTO sale on dotomarket.com has any on-chain link to these contracts: it has published no treasury address to compare.
  • What happens at listing, or whether a listing happens at all.
  • Who controls the two wallets that received almost all of the money, and where the active one sends it next.
  • TrustSniffer did not buy DOTO, did not connect a wallet and did not audit the contract beyond reading its source and its owner, treasury, supply and counters.

If you are thinking of buying, check these first

  1. Type the address yourself. According to Babak Zanjani's own site the only official DOTO address is dotomarket.com. dotomarket.org, dotomarket.net, dotomarket.link, dotomarket.top, dotomarket.click and dotomarkets.com are look-alikes. A link in a Telegram post is not proof.
  2. Ask who the legal operator is and where it is registered. A presale that names no company has no one you can hold to its promises.
  3. Read the risk page, not the Telegram post. If the two disagree about guarantees, believe the legal page and walk away.
  4. Look up the treasury on a block explorer. One ordinary wallet that also owns the sale contract is a single point of failure.
  5. Search every name a seller invokes on OFAC's sanctions list before you send money.
  6. Check any site before paying with TrustSniffer's website checker. A BNB Smart Chain address can be looked up on BscScan; our on-chain risk check covers Ethereum and TRON wallets.

If you have already paid

  1. Do not deposit more, and do not recruit friends to recover your money: referral rewards stay in the same balance.
  2. Save the evidence now: your account email, your deposit address, every transaction hash and screenshots of the channel posts that promised a guaranteed return.
  3. If you connected a wallet, the published contract lets you send unspent USDT in your own deposit address back to yourself while the sale runs (function returnDeposit). USDT already spent on DOTO has gone to the treasury and cannot be returned that way. Email accounts depend on the site for this.
  4. The site's only support is a Telegram admin account. Ask there in writing for a return of unspent USDT and keep the reply. Ignore anyone who contacts you offering to "recover" your money for a fee: that is a known follow-up scam (crypto recovery scams).
  5. Report it to your country's cybercrime police (in Iran, FATA) and to the exchange you sent the USDT from.

For exchanges and security teams

Exchanges can flag withdrawals to the treasury, to the sale contract and to the buyers' deposit addresses, which the sale contract creates itself (they appear among its internal contract-creation transactions on BscScan). The look-alike sale's fee-paying key, 0xE828…0879, had sent 875 transactions by 11 November. Abuse reports can go to the hosting provider (Vercel abuse), the registrar (Tucows abuse form) and Telegram support. The site's transparency page publishes the token, sale and USDT addresses; the token and sale contract were deployed by 0x01e0…739e.

domain   dotomarket.org      registered 2026-10-29  Tucows  NS njalla  TrustSniffer 0/100
domain   dotomarket.net      registered 2026-11-05  Tucows  NS njalla  TrustSniffer 0/100
bsc      DOTO token          0xdb0E2537c2276699E4B716cEF3acA50Ef882dCDF  supply 100,000,000,000
bsc      DOTOPrivateSale     0xBe03104753e158e414775D5f183E9B92601A0d28  deployed 2026-11-01 21:42 UTC
bsc      treasury and owner  0xe3dfc9730829e4b2a4513f42545ea0f0270a988a
bsc      deployer            0x01e04354B0B6C7FB990dBDF0310cd09bCD2d739e
bsc      received treasury   0x808d6bb193c0a531bb611745c071af7d5cdd655b  30,433.41 USDT at 2026-11-11 20:04 UTC
bsc      received treasury   0x653a1336a98207e58ba3192a1c8391da829281cc  17,134 USDT in 7 transfers, 6 to 11 Nov 2026
bsc      fee-paying key      0xE828bb0C177800d5Aa938c33C6ef54a4D44A0879  (keeper)
bsc      deposit addresses   clones created by the sale contract (CREATE2, one per buyer and referrer)

More reports on sites like these are in the TrustSniffer directory, the live threat radar and the Risk Index.

Frequently asked questions

Is dotomarket.org the official DOTO site?

No. Babak Zanjani's own website names dotomarket.com as the only official Dotomarket address and lists dotomarket.org among sites with "no connection with Dot One and Dotomarket". dotomarket.net is its twin, and dotomarkets.com is another look-alike.

Which DOTO domains are look-alikes?

dotomarket.org and dotomarket.net run the look-alike sale. dotomarket.link, dotomarket.top and dotomarket.click were registered on 11 November 2026 with the same registrar, name servers and server and are held in reserve. dotomarkets.com is a separate copy of the official site. According to Babak Zanjani's own site, the only official address is dotomarket.com.

Is Babak Zanjani behind dotomarket.org or dotomarket.net?

His own site says dotomarket.org has no connection with Dot One or Dotomarket. The link to his name comes only from the look-alikes' Telegram channel, @dotomarket_chanel, which the official dotomarket.com does not link. TrustSniffer has not established who runs the look-alike sites.

Could USDT from a sanctioned Iranian exchange get my exchange account frozen?

It can be flagged. Exchanges outside Iran screen deposits against analytics that mark addresses of designated exchanges such as Nobitex or Wallex, and each exchange decides what to do with a flagged deposit. TrustSniffer cannot predict a particular exchange's action.

Is DOTO the same as Dot One's Tala Token?

Nothing TrustSniffer found says so. Tala Token is the allegedly gold-backed token the US Treasury tied to DotOne Gold. The official dotomarket.com places DOTO on the DotOne network; the look-alike sites sell a separate BNB Smart Chain token with its own contract.

Is PancakeSwap involved in the DOTO sale?

No. PancakeSwap is a public decentralised exchange where anyone can create a trading pool. The channel names it as the planned venue for launch; it is not a partner, and a pool there is not an endorsement.

Why does a wallet report on the site's USDT address show a frozen wallet?

The look-alike sites list 0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955 as "USDT (for payment)". On BNB Smart Chain that is the USDT token contract itself, not a DOTO wallet. The same string on Ethereum is a different account, which Tether froze in March 2021; a report on it says nothing about DOTO.